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I. INTRODUCTION
From Seattle to New York City, municipalities have ordinances that allow
planning organizations to designate certain structures as landmarks. 1 Indeed, all
fifty states, the federal government, and more than one thousand cities have
passed laws to preserve historic buildings and districts. 2 When a church is
selected as a landmark, however, that selection may be more of a handicap than
an honor to the congregation. As a result of the designation, the religious
organization frequently has fewer alternatives for the use of its facility in
addition to increased financial responsibilities. Churches' complaints range
from being limited in altering the interior or exterior of the building,3 to having
additional paperwork, negotiating with the city, facing depreciation in the
market value of the property, 4 and being prohibited from replacing obsolete
structures.5 In response to the designation, churches have launched a series of
1 The Seattle Municipal Code contains a typical landmark preservation ordinance. It
allows the Landmark Preservation Board to "designate, preserve, protect, enhance and
perpetuate those sites, improvements and objects which reflect significant elements of the
City's cultural aesthetic, social, economic, political, architectural, engineering, historic or
other heritage." First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Wash.
1990), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991), (citing SEATrLE, WASH., S.M.C.
§ 25.12.020(B) (1977)).
Another example is NEW YORK CrrY, N.Y., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 205-
1.0 et seq. (1976), under which Grand Central Terminal was declared a landmark. The
ordinance was enacted pursuant to N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § a (McKinney 1977), which
provides that "it is public policy of the State of New York to preserve structures and areas
with special historical or aesthetic interest or value." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 109 n.5 (1978).
2 Elizabeth C. Richardson, Note, Applying Historic Preservation Ordinances to Church
Property: Protecting the Past and Preserving the Constitution, 63 N.C.L. REV. 404, 406
(1985) (citing inter alia Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107; CHRISTOPHER I. DUERKENSEN,
PREFACE TO A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW XXI (CHRSTOPHER I.
DUERKENSEN ed. 1983); National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1982)).
3 Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks, 40, 564 N.E.2d 571, 572 (Mass. 1990)
(interior); Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 1955) (exterior).
4 First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1355.
5 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 351 (2nd
Cir. 1990), cet. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991); Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt,
288 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (1968).
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lawsuits challenging their landmark status.6 The principal constitutional
arguments raised are that the landmark designations violate the First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion and the Fifth Amendment
protection against an uncompensated taking. 7 The courts have responded with a
variety of holdings. Some are quick to find violations of the Free Exercise and
Takings Clauses8 and others reject both claims.9
This Note will not form an all-encompassing religious landmark theory. It
will attempt to draw on the existing case law from the United States Supreme
Court, state supreme courts, and lower federal courts to create a set of
guidelines for analysis of religious landmark cases. This will include analysis
under the federal Free Exercise and Takings Clauses, in addition to a proposal
for a form of strict scrutiny to apply under state constitutional law in both free
exercise and takings cases.
Even though many cases involve free exercise and takings inquiries,10
some particular burdens on the church are more appropriately examined under
one, but not the other, form of analysis. Under federal free exercise analysis,
the only possible scenario in which a church may find relief from a landmark
designation is when the congregation's actual belief is threatened by the
regulation." In takings analysis, there may be discrimination, a physical
invasion of the property, or a government enterprise involved in the landmark
designation that will invalidate a religious landmark designation.' 2 Finally,
under state constitutional law, courts may apply least restrictive means to either
free exercise or takings analysis. In free exercise, courts may find that a
landmark designation is outweighed by a church's right to the free exercise of
religion.' 3 In takings analysis, courts may find that the landmark designation
interferes with the charitable purpose of the congregation. 14 Finally, by
employing least restrictive means, alternate solutions to a blanket landmark
6 See generally St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 348; Lafayette Park Baptist Church v.
Scott, 553 S.W.2d 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); In re Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown,
239 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1968); Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 415 N.E.2d 822 (N.Y.
1980); Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1974);
Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (1968); First Presbyterian
Church of York v. City Council of York, 360 A.2d 257, 263 (Pa. 1976) (Kramer, I.,
concurring); First Covenant, 787 P.2d 1352.
7 See, e.g., St. Bartholonmev's, 914 F.2d at 353, 356.
8 See, e.g., First Covenant, 787 P.2d 1352.
9 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 355, 357.
10 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 108-34 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 154-76 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 205-22 and accompanying text.
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designation may allow the government to preserve the historic structure but not
unduly burden the congregation. 15
I. FREE EXERCISE AND TAKINGS: FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
ANAYSIS IN RELIGIOUS LANDMARK DESIGNATION
A. Free Exercise: Generally
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... -16 In Cantwell v. Connecticut,17 the
Court applied the Free Exercise Clause to the states, holding that "these
liberties [free exercise of religious beliefs] are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a
democracy."18 The principal policy behind the religion clauses is that the
government should set only "secular goals" and achieve them in a "religiously
neutral manner." 19
A conflict with that policy of neutrality emerges, nevertheless, when the
legitimate police power of a state has an impact on a religious organization.
Even though the United States Supreme Court has swung on a pendulum of
analysis in free exercise cases,20 it has consistently held that the state may
exercise no power over the individual's religious "beliefs and opinions." 21
Thus, the state cannot force a government official to profess a belief in God, 22
or expel a student from school for not saluting the flag, if it is contrary to that
person's religious convictions.23
Even though the state cannot regulate a person's beliefs, action based on
one's religious convictions is not free from legislative restrictions. In the 1990
Supreme Court case, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith,24 the United States Supreme Court considered a pair of Oregon state
15 See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
1 6 U.S. CONST. amend. L
17 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
18 Id. at 310.
19 JOHN E. NOWAK Er AL, CONSTITUrTONAL LAW § 17.1 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
J. NOWAK].
20 Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Reviionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1109, 1109-11 (1990); Danielle A. Hess, Note, The Undoing of Mandatory
Free Exercise Accommodation-Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), 66 WASH. L. REv. 587, 588-95 (1991).
21 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
2 2 See generally Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
23 See generally West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
24 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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laws. One prohibited the use of peyote in Native American religious
ceremonies, and the other denied unemployment benefits to persons dismissed
from their jobs for violating that law.25 The Court held that even though there
was no requirement that the state prohibit the sacramental use of peyote, under
the federal Free Exercise Clause, there was no religious-practice exemption that
made such laws unconstitutional.2 6
The reasoning of Smith was a dramatic break with the balancing-of-
interests test formerly used in free exercise analysis.27 Previously, the free
exercise inquiry was multistep balancing formulation employed by the United
States Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner.28 For the first level of the test, the
person seeking to invalidate the statute would show that it placed a "substantial
burden" on a religious belief or practice. 29 If a burden existed, the government
would justify the statute by showing that it was necessary to accomplish an
"overriding governmental interest." 30 Finally, the state had to prove that the
regulation was the "least restrictive means" of achieving the government's
goal.31
By way of contrast, the Court in Smith gave greater deference to legislative
acts. It held that a "valid and neutral law of general applicability," which is not
passed with the "object" of burdening religion, is not a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause even if it prevents or forces conduct contrary to a person's
religious beliefs.32 To hold otherwise, Justice Scalia reasoned, would burden
the courts with weighing the social importance of all laws against the impact on
religious beliefs and, as a result, "permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself."33
The analysis of Smith initially contained at least three possible limitations
to confine the application of the facially neutral analysis. First, the Court
25 Id. at 874-76.
26 Id. at 890.
27 See generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Coapelled
Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 357 (1990) (free exercise exemptions
are better analyzed under the Speech Clause); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CM. L. REv. 1109 (1990) (history and
precedent of free exercise cases do not support reasoning of Smith).
28 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
29 Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 698 (1989). At least prior to Smith, the Court
was deferential in determining if a person's beliefs or practice are religious. Former Chief
Justice Burger stated that "the courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation" and that
only a claim that was "bizarre, [or] clearly nonreligious in motivation" would not receive
free exercise protection. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).3 0 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982).
31 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
32 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
33 Id. at 879, 890 (citations omitted).
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repeatedly referred to the criminal nature of the Oregon law, as if the rule of
Smith would only apply in factual contexts in which there were pressing policy
issues such as drug abuse.34 In fact, this notion would have been supported by
free exercise thinking that predated the United States Constitution Free
Exercise Clause. In original state constitutions drafted before 1789, the year in
which the federal Bill of Rights became effective, 35 many states limited free
exercise exemptions to those that did not "disturb the 'peace' or 'safety' of the
state." 36
In Smith, however, this would-be limitation disappeared within a year
when the Court vacated and remanded First Covenant Church v. City of
Seattle, a Washington State Supreme Court case.37 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the holding of the state court in a religious landmark dispute
when the state's interests could hardly have been characterized as protecting the
peace or safety of the state. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court directed the state
court to reconsider the free exercise claims in First Covenant under the Smith
facially neutral analysis. 38
An additional possible limitation of Smith was that the Court would retain
the Sherbert balancing test in disputes involving "hybrid" cases. Hybrid
cases-those in which free exercise claims are mixed with other claims, such as
free speech or free press-were specifically noted by Justice Scalia as the only
prior examples of free exercise balancing. 39 Subsequent to Smith, this
distinction has been employed by lower courts that seek to continue to use
Sherbert balancing in free exercise claims. For example, in Cornerstone Bible
Church v. Hastings,40 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded a
religious zoning case for the district court to consider in light of the church's
free exercise-free speech hybrid claim.41 Similarly, in another post-Smith case,
State v. Hershberger,42 the Minnesota Supreme Court noted the possibility, but
declined the opportunity, of analyzing an Amish free exercise case as a possible
hybrid. 43
The hybrid distinction, however, is illusory when analyzed in the factual
context of Smith. As one commentator noted, if flag burning is political speech,
34 Id. at 874, 882, 884; see also Hess, supra note 20, at 594-95.
35 Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 420 (1820).
36 McConnell, supra note 20, at 1455-61.
37 First Covenant, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct.
1097 (1991).
38 Minnesota v. Hershberger, 110 S. Ct. 1918 (1990).
39 Smith, 494 U.S. at 880.
40 No. 90-4347, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26060 (8th Cir. Nov. 1, 1991).
41 Id. at *24.
42 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
43 Id. at 396.
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sacramental use of peyote is also. 44 As such, Smith itself could well have been
analyzed as a free speech-free exercise hybrid and the Court could have used
Sherbert balancing instead of inventing the new facially neutral free exercise
doctrine.45
Finally, Justice Scalia attempted to cabin the discarded Sherbert balancing
test to unemployment cases. He noted that the Court had never invalidated a
law using Sherbert balancing out of the unemployment context.46 Scalia
distinguished these prior unemployment cases from Smith by explaining that in
Smith the Native Americans were seeking an exemption from an "across-the
board criminal prohibition." 47 By way of contrast, in the previous
unemployment cases, the believers were dismissed from jobs for refusing to
work in situations that violated their religious beliefs. 48
This distinction seems strained because the Court has, in fact, used the
Sherbert balancing test in innumerable contexts out of the unemployment
field. 49 The Court used Sherbert balancing-albeit, without finding free
exercise exemptions-in cases involving child labor laws, 50 Sunday closing
laws, 51 military exemptions, 52 and social security exemptions. 53 As Justice
O'Connor noted, it is unusual to judge the validity of a constitutional doctrine
by the "win-loss" records of plaintiffs who have used that analysis.54 Given the
chimeric nature of these possible limits on the holding of Smith, it seems likely
that free exercise balancing in federal constitutional law largely has been
relegated to history. 55
44 McConnell, supra note 20, at 1121-22 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (flag burning is a form of political speech)).
45 Id.
46 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-84.
47 Id. at 884-85.
48 Id. at 882-83 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh Day
Adventist refused to work on Saturday); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
(Jehovah's Witness refused to work in weapon plant); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (Jehovah's Witness refused to work on Sabbath)).
49 See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 897.
50 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
51 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
52 Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
53 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
54 Smith, 494 U.S. at 897.
55 William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revirionirm, 58 U.
C. L. REV. 308 (1991); McConnell, supra note 20; Hess, supra note 20.
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B. Free Exercise Analysis Applied to Landmark Designation
Even though the United States Supreme Court has not actually decided a
religious landmark case, federal religious landmark law can be distilled by
observing the fate of two lower court cases. In St. Bartholomew's Church v.
City of New York, 56 a New York congregation sought to invalidate a landmark
designation that prevented it from demolishing a Community House adjacent to
the church and building a forty-seven story tower.57 The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals conceded that the landmark designation drastically restricted the
church's ability to raise revenues. 58 Nonetheless, because the law was neutral,
generally applicable, and the congregation was not coerced in its ability to
practice its belief, the court found no free exercise violation.59 On the church's
application for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court refused the petition,
thus leaving the landmark designation valid. 60
The United States Supreme Court's treatment of the First Covenant case
gives the next step of analytical distillation in federal free exercise religious
landmark cases. In that case, the Washington Supreme Court employed the
Sherbert balancing test in deciding the validity of the landmark designation of a
downtown Seattle church. 61 The state court held that when balancing the
church's burden with the aesthetic and community interest in landmark
designation, "the latter is clearly outweighed by the constitutional protection of
free exercise of religion." 62 As a consequence, the state court found the
designation void.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. On the same day that it
denied the congregation's petition in St. Bartholomew's, the Court remanded
First Covenant for further consideration in light of the holding in Smith.63
Without holding directly on the issue, the Court determined that in religious
landmark cases, there is no per se free exercise exemption in federal
constitutional law to prevent state or local governments from designating
churches as historic structures.
There remains one additional component of the federal free exercise
inquiry. One legal commentator postulated a situation in which a church
56 914 F.2d 348 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
57 914 F.2d at 351.
5 8 Id. at 355.
59 Id.60 St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
61 First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Wash. 1990),
vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991).
62 787 P.2d at 1361 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 104 (1978)).
63 St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991); First
Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991).
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building had become inadequate for a growing congregation's worship
services. 64 Renovation, however, was infeasible and too costly because the old
and badly deteriorated structure was a landmark.65 As a result, the
congregation could not solve the space problem by selling or replacing the
structure. This imaginary situation would easily be solved with Sherbert free
exercise analysis. There would be a burden on the belief or practice of the
members of the church, and "the congregation's right to free exercise would
probably outweigh the state's interest in aesthetics and historic preservation." 66
As such, the landmark designation would be invalid.
As simple as the analysis would be under Sherbert, it is only possible to
draw from dicta of Smith to find a modem free exercise solution. In Smith,
Justice Scalia outlined the familiar belief-practice dichotomy when he reasoned
that the Free Exercise Clause would invalidate any laws that prohibit or compel
any particular view or profession. 67 By way of illustration, he hypothesized
that it would be unconstitutional to pass laws that prohibited casting statutes for
worship purposes or that made it illegal to bow down before a golden calf.68 In
contrast, he concluded that if a "generally applicable" law only has the
incidental effect-not the "object"-of prohibiting the exercise of religion, it
would not violate the United States Constitution.6 9
Between these hypothetical belief-practice poles lies the theoretical situation
of the congregation that would lose its church because of a landmark
designation. Reading Smith literally leads to the conclusion that as long as the
landmark law was not passed with the "object" of prohibiting the exercise of
religion, it would be valid under the federal Free Exercise Clause. This, as
Justice Scalia opines, is the "unavoidable consequence of democratic
government." 70
C. Takings Analysis: Generally
Federal free exercise analysis resolves cases when a congregation's beliefs
are burdened by a landmark designation. Some conflicts involving the use of
the structure or land, however, are analyzed more appropriately under the
Takings Clause. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
6 4 Evelyn B. Newell, Note, Model Free Exercise Challenges for Religious Landmarkss,
34 CASEW. RES. L. REv. 144 (1983).65 Id. at 166.
66 Id.
67 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876 (1990).
68 Id.
6 9 Id. at 879.
7 0 Id. at 890.
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compensation." 71 A modem definition of takings is, "any sort of publicly
inflicted private injury for which the Constitution requires payment of
compensation. "72
The policy that supports the Takings Clause is that when the government
either acquires private property or excessively regulates the use of property,
there is a taking and the owner must be reimbursed. 73 The view that regulation,
not just acquisition, can be a taking was a break with early federal
constitutional law. An example of the early view is the nineteenth-century case,
Muglar v. Kansas,74 in which the issue was the validity of a Kansas statute that
banned the manufacture of liquor.75 Beer brewers, who had the value of their
distilleries reduced drastically by the law, claimed that the regulation was a
taking for which they should be compensated.76 The Court held, nevertheless,
that the proper exercise of police power is not a taking, 77 and because the
property was not "devoted to the public use" the owners were not entitled to
compensation. 78
The more modem view was expressed by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,79 a case concerned with a statute that prevented certain
coal mining procedures. 80 In contrast to the limited view of Muglar, the Court
in Mahon held that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking." 81 In Mahon, the Court found that because the statute would
completely destroy underground mining rights owned by the company, 82 the
statute "went too far" and was a taking. 83
Although federal takings policy may be unchanged since Mahon, the
mechanics for deciding individual cases remains uncertain. Even the United
States Supreme Court admits that it "has been unable to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic
7 1 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
72 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
73 j. NOWAK, supra note 19, at § 11.12.
74 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
75 The statute read: "The manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors shall be forever
prohibited in this State, except for medical, scientific, and mechanical purposes." Id. at 624
(citing KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 10).
76 Muglar, 123 U.S. at 664.
77 Id. at 668-69.
78 Id. at 668.
79 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
80 The 1921 Kohler Act made it illegal for mining companies to exercise their rights to
mine under private houses even though the companies had purchased the subsurface rights
from the landowners. Id. at 412-13.81 Id. at 415.
82 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
83 Id. at 416.
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injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government." 84
Numerous articles have been written about the takings cases and numerous
theories have been propounded;85 however, "courts continue to reach ad hoc
determinations rather than principled resolutions," 86 thus adding to the
continued muddle of takings law.8 7
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York8 8 is the only United
States Supreme Court case to deal directly with takings and landmark
designation. In Penn Central, the Court concluded that there was no taking
when the city refused to allow the owners to construct a skyscraper above the
existing Penn Central Station. The Court formulated a balancing approach to
takings cases that emphasized three significant factors: The economic impact of
84 Penn Cent. Transp. Co v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
85 See, e.g., John J. Constonis, Preswnptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model
for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983) (a four-step model for "takings"
analysis: 1) Presumptive construction of the Takings Clause; 2) due process-takings inquiry;
3) pure takings phase; 4) burden of proof); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comnents on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165 (1967) (a fairness principle which proceeds without presumptions and allows
courts and legislatures to take into account the impact of free speech, discrimination and
invasions of privacy); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still
a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984) (that the competing values of property
"acquisitiveness and civic virtue" are so strong that a coherent "takings" policy is unlikely);
Thomas Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings Jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 372 (1986) (models such as Constonis' Decisional Model are too rigid to fit into the
complicated fact patterns and philosophical problems of takings cases); Stephen M. Watson,
Note, First Amendment Challenges to Landmark Preservation Statutes, XI FORDHAM
URBAN L. J. 115 (1982) [hereinafter First Amennent Challenges] (concludes that the U.S.
Supreme Court needs to define what compelling state interests can justify the landmark
designation of religious organizations); Lawrence W. Andrea, Comment, Trespass at High
Tule: The Supreme Court Gives Heightened Scrutiny to a State Imposed Easement
Requirement, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 991 (1988) [hereinafter Trespass at High Tde] (U.S.
Supreme Court is moving towards a level of scrutiny in property issues that is analogous to
equal-protection analysis); Evelyn B. Newell, Note, Model Free Exercise Challenges for
Religious Landnarks, 34 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 144 (1983) [hereinafter Free Exercise
Challenges] (First Amendment right to free exercise of religion offers protection to churches
which are burdened with landmark designation status); Elizabeth C. Richardson, Note,
Applying Historic Preservation Ordinances to Church Property: Protecting the Past and
Preserving the Constitution, 63 N.C.L. REV. 404 (1985) (compares the New York religious
landmark cases with Maher v. New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 516
F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976).86 Rose, supra note 85, at 562 (footnote omitted).
87 See generally Constonis, supra note 85; Rose, supra note 85.
88 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Grand Central Terminal was designated a landmark under the
New York City Landmarks Preservation Law. NEW YORK CrTY, N.Y., N.Y.C. ADMIN.
CODE, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 et seq. (1976); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 109.
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the regulation on the claimant, 89 the extent to which the regulation had
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, 90 and the character of
the governmental action.91
A variety of decisions, decided "largely on the particular circumstances of
each case," 92 created the Penn Central formulation. The first factor, the
economic impact of the regulation, was explored in the pivotal zoning case,
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 93 in which the Court held that zoning was not a
taking as long as the regulations were not unreasonable. 94 Subsequently, the
Court did not find a taking in Penn Central even though the owners stood to
lose three million dollars annually in rent if the proposed office tower was not
built.95 Similarly, in other takings cases, the Court reached the conclusion that
the regulations were not takings even though zoning regulations, 96 height
restrictions on buildings,97 gold mine closings, 98 and a statute requiring owners
to cut down infectious cedar trees99 caused severe economic impact on the
landowners.
The second factor, the extent of interference with investment-backed
expectations, was first discussed in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.1°° The
Court invalidated, as a taking, a regulation that completely destroyed
subsurface mining rights that the Pennsylvania Coal Company had purchased
from landowners. This factor reflects the policy that regulations, not just
government acquisitions, may be takings. 101 Regulations that merely diminish
the value of property, or deprive owners of the opportunity for unlimited
development, however, are less likely to be a taking than ones that eliminate a
specifically anticipated use of the property.10 2
89 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
93 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
94 See generally Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365.
95 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116.
96 See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927).
9 7 See, e.g., Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
98 See, e.g., United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
99 See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
100 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
101 See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
102 The "anticipated use" idea was discussed in Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104. The
Court held that the terminal's "designation as a landmark contemplates that appellants may
continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years; as a railroad
terminal containing office space and concessions. So the law does not interfere with what
must be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel or
its ability to obtain a 'reasonable return' on its investment." Id. at 136.
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The final factor, the character of the government action, can be manifested
in several ways. The government action may be discriminatory if it puts an
undue burden on one person or a small group of owners. 103 Alternatively, the
action may be enterprising, as when the government uses an owner's property
for a state project.104 Finally, as the Court specifically mentioned in Penn
Central, a physical invasion is more likely to be considered a taking than some
"adjustment in the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good." 10 5 As such, when a cable television line is installed on
rooftops of apartment buildings 0 6 or when an easement is created on private
beachfront property,10 7 there is a physical invasion, and the Court will find a
taking.
D. Takings Analysis Applied to Religious Landmarks
Even though religious landmark cases may involve both free exercise and
takings issues, takings analysis has the additional advantage to the church of
considering burdens on the church's use of its property. Federal takings law,
however, will only provide limited assistance for the congregation. The types
of designations in which the church will most likely receive relief under federal
law are those that fit into the third prong of the Penn Central formulation.' 03
The Third Prong of Penn Central
Penn Central's third prong includes designations that are either
enterprising, discriminatory, or a physical invasion. The first of these elements,
government enterprise, may occur when the state appropriates a building for
public use without compensating the owner. 10 9 The court in Lutheran Church
in America v. Oty of New York" l0 employed the enterprising element when the
103 The "discrimination" factor was also discussed in Penn Central. The Court stated
that "[i]n contrast to discriminatory zoning, the New York City law embodies a
comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they
might be found in the city, and over 400 landmarks and 31 historic districts have been
designated pursuant to this plan." Id. at 132.
104 Concerning the "enterprising" factor in Penn Central, the Court held that "[the
Landmarks Law neither exploits appellants' parcel for city purposes nor facilitates nor arises
from any entrepreneurial operations of the city." Id. at 135.
105 Id. at 124.
106 See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982).
107 See generally Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
108 See infra note 109-34 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
110 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1974).
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New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission designated the Anglo-
Italiante Brownstone structure as a landmark.111 The congregation countered
with a suit claiming that even if it added an additional wing on the church, the
building would still be totally inadequate.112 The court, citing Penn Central,113
held that the city "is attempting to add this property to the public use" by
destroying the owner's right to control the land. 114 The concurring judge in
First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of York,115 echoed this
concern, stating that the landmark designation in effect, "provide[s] for the
establishment of public museums through restrictions on private property
owners' rights." 116 In addition, he reasoned that parks and museums
traditionally have been provided for by public funds or private donations, but
now they have been dedicated to the public use without compensation for the
landowner. 117 The judge agreed with the majority, which denied that a taking
had occurred based on the fact that there was no proof that the church could not
rent, sell, or find alternate uses for the property. 118 He claimed, however, that
"we have reached a constitutional precipice and ... an advancement of even a
fraction of an inch will result in an excessive governmental encroachment upon
private property rights."119
In light of United States Supreme Court policy, it is unlikely that courts
using federal takings law will follow First Lutheran. In Penn Central, the
Court held that "[s]tates and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls to
preserv[e] the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city."1 20 Based on
that reasoning, the Penn Central Court rejected the owner's claim that the
landmark designation was an enterprise by the city, saying that "[t]his is no
more an appropriation of property by government for its own uses than is a
zoning law." 121 With this strong holding by the United States Supreme Court,
it is unlikely that the enterprise theory, without more, will disqualify a
landmark designation as a taking.
111/d. at 307-08.
112 Id. at 307.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 312.
115 360 A.2d 257 (Pa. 1976).
116 Id. at 263 (Kramer, J., concurring).
117 Id.
118Id. at 261.
119 Id. at 263.
120 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978) (citing
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1974);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 103 (1909)).
121 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135 (citing Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50).
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Another element of the third prong of the Penn Central formulation is
government discrimination. This argument was raised in St. Bartholomew's
Church v. Oty of New York when the church pointed out that over fifteen
percent of the six hundred landmarked sites in New York were religious
properties and over five percent of the total were Episcopal churches. 122 The
court responded that the high proportion of churches involved does not show
"an intent to discriminate against, or impinge on, religious belief in the
designation of landmark sites." 123 In support, the court cited Penn Central, in
which the Supreme Court held that "landmark laws are not like discriminatory,
or 'reverse spot,' zoning: that is, a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles
out a particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the
neighboring ones." 124
The holdings of St. Bartholomew's and Penn Central indicate that the
discriminatory element of the third prong of the Penn Central takings
formulation will be met not by proving disproportionate impact, but by proving
that the regulation "singl[ed] out individual landowners for disparate and unfair
treatment." 125 The Court in Penn Central also indicated that courts will
"indentiffy] arbitrary or discriminatory action in the context of landmark
regulation [as] in the context of classic zoning or indeed in any other
context." 126 For that reason, if there is a reasonable basis for the regulation,
churches seeking to employ the discriminatory element of the takings test will
have little success invalidating the statute as facially discriminatory. 127 Rather,
if there is evidence that the ordinance has been unfairly applied, the religious
organization may be able to prove an individual instance of discrimination and
establish an uncompensated taking.
The final element of the third prong of Penn Central is a physical invasion.
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATW Corp.,128 Teleprompter, acting
under a New York state law, installed a one-half inch cable and two four-inch
silver boxes across the landowner's building to provide service to the television
company's clients.' 29 Although the statute provided for a "reasonable
122 St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
123 914 F.2d at 354.12 4 Id. at 355 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132).
125 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132.
12 6 Id. at 133 (footnote omitted).
127 Id. n.29.
128 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
12 9 Id. at 422.
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payment" of fifty dollars,130 the Court held that "a physical intrusion by
government [is] an unusually serious character," and when it is permanent, a
taking has occurred. 131
The dissent in Loretto decried the "per se rule based on 'permanent
physical occupation.'"' 132 Indeed, there is no balancing of the multifactor
formulation when there is a government invasion of private property. 133 As a
result, the holdings in religious landmark cases with physical invasions will
likely be similar to that in Loretto. Any government intrusion on religious
property, such as the dedication of church property for public use as a street or
sidewalk, 134 would be a taking.
Federal takings analysis applied to religious landmarks yields predictable
results in some similar factual situations. When the courts apply the third prong
of the Penn Central test, at least two of the three elements yield fairly
consistent holdings. The court will find a taking if the regulation involves a
physical invasion, or if the landowner can prove an individual case of
discrimination. If, however, the court finds that the government has
appropriated the property for its own use, only some courts will find a taking
under the enterprise element of the third prong.
130 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 828 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) provides:
1. No landlord shall...
b. demand or accept payment from any tenant, in any form, in exchange for
permitting cable television service on or within his property or premises, or from any
cable television company in exchange therefor in excess of any amount which the
commission shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable ....
In this case, the landlord previous to the plaintiff received a flat installation fee of $50
for a five year agreement. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 443.
13 1 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
132 ld. at 456 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
133 The majority held that "a permanent physical occupation is a government action of
such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a court might
ordinarily examine." Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104) (footnote
omitted).
134 See generally Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood, 626
P.2d 668, 674 (Colo. 1981).
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III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RELIEF FOR RELIGOUS
LANDMARKS
A. State Constitutional Law
Given the current condition of federal free exercise135 and takings136
constitutional law, congregations that seek to challenge a landmark designation
likely will need more in their litigation arsenal to prevail in the courts. State
supreme courts, by way of comparison, have created or preserved greater
rights for the individual than has the Supreme Court. As a consequence, under
state law, churches have been able to maintain greater control of the use of
their buildings.
Many state constitutions predate the United States Constitution.137 In the
Judiciary Act of 1789 Congress gave the Supreme Court the power of certiorari
over decisions in state supreme courts. 138 That jurisdictional review, however,
is not all encompassing. Only cases meeting the statutory criteria will be
subject to federal court examination. Those categories of cases are judgments
which: First, question the validity of a federal treaty or statute; second,
question the validity of a state law as being repugnant to federal law; or third,
claim a right or immunity under federal law. 139 The corollary to this provision
is that when there is an independent and adequate state ground on which to
base the judgment, the Supreme Court will not, at least in theory, 140 review the
state court decision.141
One such state ground is when the state constitutional or statutory law
provides greater rights to an individual than does federal law. 142 For example,
in 1972, the Supreme Court of California rejected the idea that the California
and United States Constitution offered coextensive rights against cruel and
unusual punishment. 143 In People v. Anderson, the California court refused to
135 See supra note 56-70 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 122-34 and accompanying text.
137 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410, 1455-58 (1990).
138 Judiciary Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988). As originally enacted, the Judiciary Act
distinguished between appeals and certiorari. The 1988 amendments to that Act removed
the mandatory appeal and made certiorari the only path to Supreme Court review. Id. at
note (Amendments).139 Id. at (a).
140 Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U.S. 324 (1984) (White, J., concurring) (advising the
state court how the case would have been decided differently under federal law).
141 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-36 (1874).
142 Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure; State Court
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421, 430 (1974).
143 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
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consider federal constitutional law and ruled that capital punishment was both
cruel and unusual under the California Constitution. 144 Similarly, in Ravin v.
State,145 the Supreme Court of Alaska construed the state's constitutional
"right to privacy" and declined to be limited by federal law. 146 In that case, the
Alaska court noted the distinctively independent character of the Alaskan
people and held that in-home use of marijuana was protected under the state's
constitutional right to privacy. 147 The current United States Supreme Court
seems to endorse this federal concept of states' autonomy. In Smith, even
though the Court limited the federal right to free exercise of religion, it noted
that twenty-three states have statutory or judicial exemptions that allow the
sacramental use of peyote.148
B. Least Restrictive Means. Generally
The least restrictive means test is a level of strict scrutiny that forces the
government to consider alternate, less burdensome methods to pursue its
purposes in regulation.' 49 In land-use cases and those implicating free exercise
conflicts, legal commentators and courts specifically have recommended its
use.' 50 This Note proposes that least restrictive means be used in either free
exercise or takings analysis under state constitutional law in religious landmark
cases. The test would be: Has the government used the least restrictive means
to preserve the historic structure to allow the religious congregation's free
144 Id. at 883 n.1, 895-99. Interestingly enough, the California electorate overrode its
own supreme court when it enacted, by plebiscite, a state constitutional amendment
providing for capital punishment. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
145 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
146 ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22. The privacy amendment to the Alaska Constitution
reads: "[tihe right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. The
legislature shall implement this section."
The court reasoned by analogy using the policies of privacy given to home activities in
federal cases, but specifically supported its holding on the text of the state constitution and
precedent on prior Alaska cases. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 503-04 (Alaska 1975).
14 7 Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
148 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 912 n.5
(1990).
149 The Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972), included the least
restrictive means test in the "formula" for strict scrutiny. It explained that in strict scrutiny
analysis a statute which burdens a constitutionally protected activity must be "tailored" to
serve its purpose and must use the "less drastic means" of accomplishing that goal. Id. at
343 (citation omitted); see also Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270, 277 (C.D. Ill. 1979).
150 City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 639 P.2d 1358, 1363 (Wash. 1982) (citing
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S 398, 407 (1963)); Scott D. Godshall, Note, Land Use
Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 1562, 1587 (1984).
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exercise of religion or to allow its charitable purpose to continue? If not, the
landmark designation is void.
The mechanics of the least restrictive means test were illustrated in a
Sherbert-balancing case, Thomas v. Review Board.151 The Supreme Court
balanced the two competing interests to determine if the law was the least
restrictive method of implementing a government policy.152 The state claimed
that granting unemployment benefits to conscientious objectors, who refused to
work in a tank factory, would create widespread unemployment in addition to
unnecessarily detailed questioning by employers into applicants' religious
beliefs. 153 The Court rejected the state's argument and found that the regulation
would have little if any impact on those stated goals. The Court held that
although the possible unemployment and questioning were important
considerations, "the interests advanced by the State do not justify the burden
placed on free exercise of religion"; 154 thus, the regulation was void. 155
C. Least Restrictive Means: Free Exercise
In free exercise cases specifically, state courts frequently have increased,
rather than decreased, individual exceptions to otherwise valid state laws. For
example, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the state's free exercise clause
excluded native Athabascans from seasonal hunting regulations. 156 Using the
Sherbert test, the court reasoned that moose meat was essential to religious
funeral "potlachs" and that the burdens on the state's hunting regulations and
the moose population were small.157 Consequently, the Athabascans were
given a judicially crafted free exercise exemption to hunt moose out of season
for potlach services. 158
Similarly, in one of the first cases to consider a state's free exercise clause,
subsequent to Smith, the Supreme Court of Minnesota actually rejected federal
free exercise analysis. In State v. Hershberger, Amish defendants had been
fined for refusing to use red, triangular, slow-moving vehicle emblems on their
horsedrawn buggies. 159 The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the traffic
regulation violated the defendants' right to free exercise of religion by forcing
151 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
152 Id. at 718-20.
153 Id. at 719.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 720.
156 Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Alaska 1979).
157 Id. at 1072-75.
158 Id. at 1075.
159 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989), rev'dforfurther consideration, 110 S. Ct. 1918
(1990) (considering the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court which held that the statute
was an unconstitutional violation of the defendant's free exercise of religion).
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them to use "a symbol whose color and meaning are antithetical to their
faith." 160 The United States Supreme Court, nonetheless, vacated the decision
and ordered the state to reconsider the case under Smith's facially neutral
analysis. 161 The Supreme Court of Minnesota declined. 162 The court reasoned
that the "Minnesota Constitution alone provides an independent and adequate
state constitutional basis on which to decide." 163 Using state constitutional free
exercise least restrictive means analysis, the Minnesota court held that the
Amish defendants were entitled to an exemption from the traffic regulation. 164
Religious landmark cases, specifically, have been analyzed under state free
exercise constitutional law subsequent to Smith. In December of 1990, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered Society of Jesus v. Boston
Landmarks Commission,165 in which the church sought an exemption from a
landmark designation that prevented it from remodeling the interior of the
church.' 66 Although the trial court based its analysis on the federal Free
Exercise Clause, the Massachusetts Supreme Court limited its reasoning to
state constitutional law. 167 Holding that because the Massachusetts Constitution
provided absolute freedom for religious practice "'without any control
whatsoever,'" the church should be granted an exemption from the landmark
designation. 168
If state courts continue to employ least restrictive means analysis in free
exercise landmark cases, legislative threats to the free exercise of religion will
be judicially restrained. One such threat is the potential imbalance of religious
exemptions in favor of a majority religion. If religious practices are controlled
completely by the democratic process, as suggested by Justice Scalia in
Smith,169 the inevitable result is that the majority religion will accommodate its
own beliefs without considering those of minority religions.' 70 As Justice
O'Connor stated in her concurring opinion in Smith, "the First Amendment
was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practices
are not shared by the majority." 171 With least restrictive means applied in state
160 State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1990).
161 110 S. Ct. at 1918.
162 462 N.W.2d at 396.
163 Id. at 396-97.
164 Id. at 399.
165 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
166 Id. at 572.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 573 (citations omitted).
169 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
170 McConnell, supra note 20, at 1130-32.
171 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902
(1990) (O'Connor, I., concurring).
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courts, all burdens on free exercise, not just those of the majority, will be
accommodated equally.
An additional danger, which will be controlled by least restrictive means
analysis, is the unavoidable impact on minority religious beliefs. Despite the
familiar distinction between belief and practice, often the line between the two
is impossible to determine.172 For example, under Smith, laws may prohibit
sacramental use of peyote or, if the minority controlled the legislature, forbid
the use of wine in communion. 173 As a result of the practice of religion being
destroyed, there is an inevitable burden on the religious belief.174 At the
extreme, when a law prohibits a central practice, such as communion, minority
groups will have to forgo the exercise of their beliefs or move to a more
accommodating milieu. 175 Least restrictive means analysis reduces the burden
on the minority beliefs by seeking alternate solutions to laws that burden the
practice of religion.
In religious landmark cases in particular, under state constitutional free
exercise balancing, a court will be more likely to find a burden on free exercise
as a result of a landmark designation. The most likely difference between state
and federal free exercise landmark law would be the hypothetical case in which
a congregation would lose its church because of the designation. Just as in
Sherbert balancing, under state least restrictive means analysis, the burden on
the church would outweigh the compelling interest of the state and the
designation would be void. 176
D. Least Restrictive Means and the Establishment Clause
The use of alternate solutions for religious landmarks may, however, run
afoul of the "natural antagonism" 177 between the two religion clauses of the
Constitution. Although the First Amendment provides for the free exercise of
religion, it also prohibits the government from "the establishment of
religion." 78 The underlying policy of the Establishment Clause is that religion
and government will be most effective if "each is left free from the other within
its respective sphere."'1 79
In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York,180 a case that bears on religious
landmark analysis, the Court struggled to "find a neutral course"' 8 ' between
172 Sidth, 494 U.S. at 893-94 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)).
173 McConnell, supra note 20 at 1135.
174 Smith, 494 U.S. at 919-20 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
175 Id.; see also Hess supra note 20, at 598.
176 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
177 . NOWAK, supra note 19, at § 17.2.
178 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
179 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
180 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Walz addressed the
constitutionality of New York state property tax exemptions for religious
organizations.182 The Court held that the government may not establish, or
interfere with, religion; 183 however, the Establishment Clause does not require
"that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and
State."' 84 Indeed, there should be some "play in the joints productive of a
benevolent neutrality." 18 5 In Walz, because no one particular church or group
of churches were given tax-exempt status, 186 the statute did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 187
Just as the Free Exercise Clause underwent a radical analytical revision in
Smith, there is the equal possibility that the Establishment Clause will be
altered by the current Court.' 88 Justice Scalia, as the author of Smith, has
tried-so far unsuccessfully-to incorporate the facially neutral analysis into
free speech cases. 189 Additionally, in a recent Establishment Clause case,
Edwards v. Aguillard,190 in which the Court struck down the teaching of
"creation science" in public schools, he recommended a more restrained
judicial role. Greater deference to legislative acts, he contended, would give
more predictability and ease the "tension between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses."191
Under current Walz analysis, or even with Scalia's "save not destroy"
philosophy, 192 the effect of the Establishment Clause on this Note's proposal
should be analogous to the result in Walz. Even though there would be some
"indirect economic benefit" 193 to churches from deferential legislative
treatment, exemptions probably are not unconstitutional because the
181 Id. at 668.
182 Id. at 666.
183 Id. at 669.
184 Id. at 664 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 673.
187 Id. at 675.
188 Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (lst Cir. 1990), cei. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305
(1991), deals with the Establishment Clause problem of whether invocations and
benedictions at public school graduations are unconstitutional.
189 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia agreed that a local law prohibiting nude dancing did not violate the Free
Speech Clause, but urged that the legislation should be upheld because it was "a general law
regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression, it is not subject to First-
Amendment scrutiny at all." Id. at 2463.
190 482 U.S. 578, 626 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 640.
192 Id. at 626.
19 3 Id. at 674.
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government does not transfer revenues to the church, but merely refrains from
"demanding that the church support the state." 194
Although the exemptions may not be excessive, landmark exclusions
almost certainly will also have to apply to other charitable organizations to be
constitutional. In Walz, the Court noted that the New York property tax
exemption also applied to charitable, historical, or educational institutions and
other "nonprofit, quasi-public corporations." 195 Subsequently, in Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, the Court explained that tax exemptions that applied
to religious publications, but not other nonsectarian groups, actually did violate
the Establishment Clause.196 As a consequence, least restrictive means analysis
probably will have to be applied to all charitable institutions, not just religious
organizations, to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. That would,
however, only strengthen the policy reasons for the use of the least restrictive
means analysis. Indeed, the accommodation of the mutually beneficial
charitable efforts of private and government organizations is perhaps the most
convincing justification for a deferential approach to landmark designation of
religious landmarks. 197
E. Least Restrictive Means: Takings
A hint of how far a state court may be willing to expand takings analysis
appeared in the original Washington State Supreme Court First Covenant
decision. In dicta, the state court hypothesized about the use of strict scrutiny in
the Takings Clause.198 After losing on federal grounds in the United States
Supreme Court, the church logically seized on the state constitutional issues
when the case was reargued on remand. 199 Although it is uncertain whether the
state court will reinstate its religious landmark exemption on remand, it had
previously recommended the least restrictive means approach in other church
land-use conflicts. It held, in a church zoning case, that a city is required to use
the least restrictive means of achieving its compelling interest because in the
194 Id.
195 Id.; see also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
196 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 8, 9 & n.1.
197 See infra notes 222-35 and accompanying text.
198 The First Covenant court suggested that the United States Supreme Court in Penn
Central would have found a taking "had it analyzed the law under strict scrutiny." First
Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352, 1361 (Wash. 1990), vacated and
remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991).
199 Respondent's Brief on Remand at 20-35, First Covenant (No. 56377-2) (citing
Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmark Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990); State v.
Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990)).
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final analysis, "accommodation between the competing interests must be the
goal." 200
In an earlier New York Court of Appeals case, Trustees of Sailors' Snug
Harbor v. Platt,201 the state court had already advanced, at least partially,
toward the least restrictive means dicta in the First Covenant decision. In Snug
Harbor, the New York court formed a charitable institution analog for the
second prong of the Penn Central formulation. 202 The court held that a test for
a charity would be: When a landmark designation either physically or
financially "interferes with carrying out the charitable purpose the designation
would be void:"203 This test has been cited widely204 and is based on the
policy that charitable organizations are not created to make profits as are
private businesses. 205
The Second Prong of Penn Central Applied to the "Charitable Purpose
Test"
The broad acceptance of the charitable purpose test, however, masks the
difficulty of applying it to particular circumstances. The easiest way to predict
the outcome of applying the charitable purpose test to churches is to look at
two common scenarios in religious landmark designation; first, when landmark
status imperils the church's current charitable programs, and second, when its
planned expansion of those programs is prevented by the designation.
1. The Church's Current Activities Are Imperiled by the Landmark
Designation
In Lutheran Church v. City of New York,2°6 the New York Court of
Appeals employed the charitable purpose test to analyze a landmark designation
that would have stopped the church's charitable activities. The court noted that
the landmark designation would force the church to discontinue the use to
200 City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 639 P.2d 1358, 1363-64 (Wash. 1982).
201 288 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (1968).
202 See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
203 Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 415 N.E.2d 922, 925 (N.Y. 1980).
204 See generally St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348,
352-53, 356 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991); Ethical Culture, 415 N.E.2d at
922; Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1974); First Covenant
Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352, 1364-65 (Wash. 1990) (Utter, L, concurring),
vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991) (citing Lutheran Church, for the "charitable
purpose" test).2 05 Ethical Culture, 415 N.E.2d at 925.
206 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1974).
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which the property had been put for over twenty years. 207 Because the church's
status as a landmark would have stopped its current charitable activities, the
court found a taking.208
Not all courts have accepted this reasoning, most notably the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in First Presbyterian Church v. City of York.209 There, the
church sought to demolish the adjoining, landmarked York House.210 The
court rejected the Snug Harbor charitable purpose test, holding that the
landmark designation would not "preclude the use of York House for any
purpose for which it was reasonably adapted." 211 Therefore, if the church
could use its property for any purpose, not just the current charitable
activities,212 the landmark designation was not unconstitutional.
The rule found in York is even more restrictive than Penn Central's
investment-backed expectations test. The Court in Penn Central justified not
finding a taking when it noted that the landowners "may continue to use the
property precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years." 213 A regulation
that destroys an investment-backed expectation is one which "totally defeat[s] a
distinctly crystallized expectation [that is] demonstrably afoot" at the time of
the regulation. 214 Therefore, most courts, even without expanding individual
rights, will likely find a taking if, because of a landmark designation, a
religious organization cannot use its property for a charitable purpose precisely
as it has been used in the past.
2. The Church's Planned Epansion of Current Charitable Activities Will
Be Impossible Because of the Landmark Designation
A more difficult situation arises when the church is engaged in a charitable
purpose, but is unable to expand the scope of those current activities because of
the landmark designation. The courts in St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of
New York215 and Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt216 faced this issue in two
recent New York cases. In Ethical Culture, a religious organization sought to
remove a landmark designation and subsequently demolish an auxiliary meeting
house in order to develop its property more profitably. Similarly, in St.
Bartholomew's, the congregation wanted to destroy a building adjacent to the
207 Id. at 310.
208 Id. at 311 (citing the lower court, Appellate Division).
209 360 A.2d 257 (Pa. 1976).
210 Id. at 259-60.
211 Id. at 261.
212 Id.
213 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
214 Mechelman, supra note 85, at 1233 (citations omitted).
215 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
216 415 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1980).
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church, which was also designated as a landmark, to build a forty-seven story
office tower. The church argued that the landmark designation impaired its
ability to continue and expand the charitable activates that were central to its
ministry. 217 Moreover, the church claimed that the proposed office tower
would provide space and income to support those programs. 218
In both cases, the courts ruled against the religious organizations. In
Ethical Culture, the court held that "there simply is no constitutional
requirement that a landowner always be allowed his property's most beneficial
use."219 Similarly, in St. Bartholomew's the court held that a landmark
designation "may 'freeze' the Church's property in its existing use and prevent
the Church from expanding or altering its activities, Penn Central explicitly
permits this." 220
Even under the charitable purpose test, without least restrictive analysis,
many religious landmarks will be found not to be takings. An anomalous
situation is created, however, when a church is designated a landmark, and the
charitable activities of the organization are frozen at their current level. The
government prevents a nongovernment institution from furthering charitable
activities that are traditional state functions. 221 If, however, the state courts
apply a least restrictive reasoning to the charitable purpose test, the church's
and state's seemingly competing claims can be reconciled. The municipality
will be able to preserve its historical districts without defeating the efforts of
religious organizations that are providing charitable services that might
otherwise default to the government.222
F. Least Restrictive Alternatives for Free Exercise or Takings
Given the advantages of strict scrutiny in either takings or free exercise
analysis, there remains the problem of identifying the less restrictive
alternatives available to the church and the state. One approach is to create a
contract between the city and the church in which the property owner would
217 St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 351.
218 Id. at 353-54. The court seems to indicate that it would not allow either the
expansion of the church's current charitable activities or an increase the number of
programs. It held that "[s]o long as the Church can continue to use its property in the way
that it has been using it-to house its charitable and religious activity-there is no
unconstitutional taking." Id. at 357.
219 Ethical Culture, 415 N.E.2d at 326 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 592 (1962)).
220 St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 356.
221 See, e.g., Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314, 315-16
(1968) (providing a home for retired seafaring men); St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 351
(community ministry program providing food, clothing and shelter to indigent persons).2 22 See infra notes 223-35 and accompanying text.
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agree to preserve the building in a mutually satisfactory condition. 223 In 1880,
however, the Supreme Court established the rule that local governments cannot
"bargain away the police power." 224 Nonetheless, in the case of land use,
states and municipalities have successfully employed less sweeping methods for
coordinated development.225 One such technique is the use of "development
agreements" created under a state enabling act.2 26 These agreements, which
allow for procedural and substantive safeguards as well as protection from
possible governmental noncompliance, 227 have been used without co-opting the
reserved rights of municipalities. The development agreement projects range
from the creation of ski hills228 to preserving farmland in "agricultural
preserves." 229 The advantage of applying this alternative to religious landmarks
is that the church would be able to bargain for restrictions on the property that
would not limit its charitable activities. In addition, the city would receive
contractual assurances that certain changes in the building would not be made
and that repairs and maintenance will continue.
Another option is for the city to allow modifications to the existing
structure that will include waiving certain zoning requirements. Zoning
classifications that differ from other properties in the area often are called "spot
zoning." 230 This policy was endorsed in Westchester Reform Temple v.
Brown. 23 1 In Westchester, the church requested zoning waivers from setback
and side-yard restrictions in order to expand its building beyond the Planning
Commission's limits for the size of lot on which the building was located. 23 2
The New York Court of Appeals held that "churches and schools occupy a
different status from mere commercial enterprises and, when the church enters
the picture, different considerations apply." 23 3  With this approach,
congregations could present proposed alterations in their buildings to zoning
commissions that would accommodate their anticipated charitable needs without
destroying the portions of the building that the city sought to maintain. If those
proposals included zoning variances, the flexibility by the city would allow
223 Newell, Free Exercise Challenges, supra note 85, at 168.
224 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1880).
225 Judith W. Wenger, Utopian Visions: Cooperation Without Conflicts in
Public/Private Ventures in CrrY DEAL MAKING 57, 71-72 (Lassar ed. 1990).
226 Id. at 72.
227 Judith W. Wenger, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning,
Development Agreements and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land use
Deals, 65 N.C.L. REV. 957, 994-1003, 1008-30 (1987).
228 E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist., 613 F.2d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 1980).
229 Delucci v. County of Santa Cruz, 225 Cal. Rptr. 43, 44-45, cert denied, 479 U.S.
803 (1986).
230 BLAC'S LAW DICrIONARY 1258 (5th ed. 1979).
231 239 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1968).
232 Id. at 894.
233 Id.
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"less restrictive alternatives than strict enforcement of all the technical
provisions of the code while still fulfilling the legitimate governmental
interests." 234
A final alternative that would accommodate least restrictive means analysis,
would be to coordinate the architectural style of the new or expanded building
with the historic landmarks that the government wants to preserve. For
example, in New York City, engineers combined turn-of-the-century
construction with a modem high rise to restore two landmarks on Fifth Avenue
and erect a new skyscraper. 235 There, the new building was constructed as a
backdrop to match the style of the Rizzoli and Coty buildings, both of which
were rehabilitated landmarks. 236 Architects employed even more imagination in
Washington, D.C., where the original facades of historic landmarks were
integrated into a new apartment complex. 23 7 On the sites of an S.S. Kresge
store and a brewing company warehouse, the original ornamental terra cotta
facades were used as the exterior for a fifty million dollar apartment and theatre
structure.2 8
Advantages to the Community from Least Restrictive Means
Not only would churches benefit with strict scrutiny, but there would be
benefits to society from the least restrictive means. When cities and churches
employ alternative solutions such as city-church contracts, zoning variances, or
old and new architecture coordination, the consequence is that the community
will share the burden of preserving the historic district. For example, if a city
grants a zoning variance, all the surrounding property owners may in some
way have the value of their property decreased by the spot zoning allowed for
the church. 23 9 Nevertheless, the Indiana Supreme Court supported the idea of
spreading the cost of a church's activities to the rest of the community holding
that no landowner of private property adjacent to a church should complain if
his property "is depreciated to some extent, since the purpose of the zoning
234 City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 639 P.2d 1358, 1363-64 (Wash. 1982).
235 NYC Landmark/High RiMse Meshes Old and New, 60 Civ. ENGINEERJNG, May 16,
1990, at 16.
23 6 Id. (photo).
237 Historic Facades Savedfor Reuse, 225 E.N.R., Sept. 6, 1990, at 20.
2 38 Id. (photo).
239 See generally JAMES E. CURRY, PUBLIC REGULATION OF THE RELIGIOUS USE OF
LAND 85-104 (1964). The author notes the various approaches in the courts to surrounding
property owner's claims that the value of their land is decreased by spot zoning for
churches. The cases show that it is often difficult to determine the effect of spot zoning on
neighboring lots. The author claims that "the depreciation issue may involve not only the
question (a) whether prices have gone down, but also (b) whether they have gone up less
rapidly than they would have risen with the depressing factor of the church." Id. at 103.
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laws is not to protect private, personal interest, but rather to protect and
promote the general public interest."2' 40 Even though there may be a burden to
other landowners in the community, there will be consequential benefits that
result from alternative solutions to religious landmark exemptions. In contrast
to St. Bartholomew 2 41 and Ethical Culture,242 in which the religious
organizations' charitable activities were not allowed to expand, when
alternative solutions are explored through the least restrictive means, charitable
activities will continue to grow. Not only would the immediate beneficiaries of
the philanthropy receive assistance, but the taxpayers of the community would
have their burden of supporting government activities reduced because of the
continued increase in private charities.
IV. CONCLUSION
When a church is designated as a landmark, often the congregation suffers
restrictions on its use of the building, as well as additional financial burdens.
Federal free exercise analysis provides relief to churches only if there is a
burden on the congregation's religious convictions. Additionally, the
formulation of Penn Central likely will only find a taking when the government
action is discriminatory, or a physical invasion. Without a more flexible
approach churches frequently will be burdened in the exercise of their religion
or forced to forgo expanding their charitable activities.
If state courts apply the least restrictive means test in free exercise and
takings scenarios, alternative solutions such as city-church contracts, zoning
variances, and old-new architecture combinations are possible. Consequently,
congregations will be able to practice their religious beliefs, and expand
philanthropic projects without destroying the historic buildings that the
government wishes to preserve. As a result, those persons in need of churches'
charitable aid will continue to receive assistance, the government will be
relieved of a portion of its traditional responsibility for social programs,
municipalities will be able to preserve their historic landmarks, and the burden
of accommodating the alternatives to blanket landmark designation will be
spread more evenly to the entire community.
Ted L. Wills
240 Board of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 172 N.E.2d 39, 241,243 (Ind. 1961).
241 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
2 42 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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